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RECENT DECISIONS
Decedents' Estates: Increase Resulting from Stock Splits Prior
to Testator's Death-Testatrix's will, after bequeathing household
goods and personal effects to her cousin, provided:
"I give and bequeath unto my sister-in-law, Ann J. Allen ....
330
shares of General Motors common stock."
In the same language, she bequeathed 140 shares of General Electric stock to Ruth Sargent and 60 shares thereof to Ruth Holmes.
She likewise disposed of her remaining stock in bequests of a specific
number of shares to named relatives, friends, and her favorite charity.
The residue was to be given to the Home for Destitute Crippled
Children.
After the will was executed, but before the testatrix's death, General Electric and General Motors declared a three for one stock split.
Testatrix died without having changed her will. An inventory of her
estate disclosed that at her death she owned the identical shares issued
by reason of the stock splits.
The executors of testatrix's estate petitioned for construction of
the will. On appeal from the lower court decision adverse to the
residuary legatee: Held, affirmed; the additional shares resulting from
the stock splits and the dividends which accrued thereon after testatrix's death were to be awarded to the named legatees rather than to
the residuary legatee. Allen v. National Bank of Austin, 19 Ill. App.
2d 149, 153 N.E. 2d 260 (1958).
In attempting to solve the distribution problem several avenues of
approach were open to the court. It could have considered the bequests
to be general or specific gifts, or it could have disregarded the classification of the gifts and decided the issue exclusively on what was
found to have been testatrix's intent.
The decisional law of cases involving a gift of the type "X shares
of Y stock to L" is characterized by a lack of uniformity. When an
increase question is of primary concern, substantial authority can be
found holding the gift to be general or specific." Regardless of how an
individual court may classify a particular gift, those courts which determine gift distribution solely on their classification of the bequest
have generally recognized the difference in legal effect of finding a
2
bequest to be specific or general in "stock-split" cases.

2

In re McDougald's Estate, 149 Fla. 468, 6 So. 2d 274 (1942) (general); In
re Dreyfus' Estate, 192 Misc. 509, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 548 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (special) ;
Paulus, Special and General Legacies of Securities-Whither Testator's Intent, 43 IOWA L. REV. 467, 485 (1958).
Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 101 Conn. 359, 125 Atl. 871 (1924);
First National Bank v. Union Hospital, 281 Mass. 64, 183 N.E. 247 (1932);
First National Bank v. Charlton, 281 Mass. 72, 183 N.E. 250 (1932) ; Paulus,
supra note 1, at 505.
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Where a bequest is of a certain number of shares of a designated
stock, as here involved, in the absence of any possessory words or
other language in the will indicating that the stock to be given is that
presently owned by the testatrix, there is numerous authority holding
that bequest to be general.3 The rationale used by the courts in so
holding is found in their belief that, in the absence of a contrary expressed intention, the testatrix desires her gift to be effective, even in
4
the case of sale or destruction of the item bequeathed before death.
This position is probably an outgrowth of the 1840 decision of Robinson
v. Addison5 which indicated an aversion to the specific bequest in the
absence of clear intention of the testatrix to the contrary. 6
The legal significance of determining a gift of this type to be
general is the fact that a stock split occurring after the will was executed would not alter the number of shares received by the legatee.
Thus, in the instant case, Ann Allen would receive only 330 shares of
the split stock, notwithstanding the greatly reduced per share par value
thereof.1 The theory of the general gift being based on the premise
that the testatrix intends to give a pecuniary gift in the form of a
certain number of shares of stock upon her death, it would be illogical
to conclude that the legatee should get three times such quantity following a stock split. Thus, in the event of a stock split involving a
general legacy, the residuary legatee, the Home for Destitute Crippled
Children in this case, would receive the additional shares of stock.
While general legatees are not entitled to increase in the nature of
additional shares of stock, or, for the same reason, any cash or stock
dividends declared on the stock before or after testatrix's death, they
are entitled to increase in the form of the legal rate of interest paid on
their legacy beginning one year from testatrix's death.8 This is the
common law rule and is applied in the absence of statutory provisions
or testamentary language to the contrary.9
However, a different result would be reached by a court that determined these gifts to be specific, rather than general.
There seems to be little doubt that if the bequest is described with
3 ATKINSON, WILLS §132 (2d ed. 1953); Paulus,

supra note 1, at 515; 4 PAGE,
WILLS §1397 (3rd ed. 1941); In re Blomdahl's Will, 216 Wis. 590, 257 N.W.
152, 258 N.W. 168 (1934) ; 28 R.C.L. 293, §268 (1929) ; Clegg v. Lippold, 123
N.E. 2d 549 (Ohio Prob. 1951).
4 In re Snyder's Estate, 217 Pa. St. 71, 66 At. 157 (1907); Tifft v. Porter,
8 N.Y. 516, 521 (1853).
52 Beav. 515, 48 Eng. Rep. 1281 (Ch. 1840).
6 Paulus, supra note 1, at 468.
7 First National Bank v. Charlton, supra note 2.
8 State Bank of Chicago v. Gross, 344 Ill. 512, 176 N.E. 739, 75 A.L.R. 172
(1931) ; In re Wadskier's Will, 88 N.J.Eq. 589, 103 Atl. 188 (1918) ; Matter
of Bremer's Will. 156 Misc. 160, 281 N.Y.S. 264 (1935) ; In re Brandon's
Estate, 164 Wis. 387, 160 N.W. 177 (1916).
9 Cleary v. White's Estate, 134 Conn. 367, 58 A. 2d 1 (1948) ; State Bank of
Chicago v. Gross, supra note 8; Hamilton v. McQuillan, 82 Me. 204, 19 Atl.
167 (1889) ; In re Forster's Will, 195 Wis. 58, 217 N.W. 740 (1928).
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the use of possessive words, it is specific.' 0 Thus, if the bequest had
been "my 330 shares of General Motors," most, if not all courts would
find the gift to be specific." Similarly, when the gift is "X shares bf
Y stock which I now hold," it is usually held to present sufficient evidence that the gift was intended to be specific.12 When such possessive
words are included in the description of the gifts, other indications
13
of testatrix's intent usually have little influence on the courts.
However, the absence of possessive words does not conclusively
establish the gift as general.1 4 When such possessive donative words
are not used, other language of the will or extrinsic facts must be
consulted to acquire an indication of classification. For example, if
the language of the gift is non-possessive but the corporation in which
the stock is given is a "closed" corporation and the stock is not available
on the public exchanges, the bequest may be found to be specific. 15
Also, if the stock given coincides with the number of shares owned at
execution (as in the instant case), testatrix probably intended to give
the specific stock then held.' 6 This assumption is particularly strong
in some jurisdictions if the bequest describes an odd lot or fractional
7
shares.'
If the bequest is determined to be specific, the legatee is in a
much more favorable position than a general legatee in these stock
split cases. It is generally held that if the stock split does not cause
an ademption, the legatee takes the amount of the new stock which
represents the number of shares of the old which were specifically
bequeathed.'"
This same advantageous position is retained by specific legatees
when dividends are declared on the stock after testatrix's death and
before the stock is distributed. The specific legatee is entitled, not
to interest commencing one year after testatrix's death as with a
10 Paulus, supra note 1, at 515. In Wisconsin, unless there are words specifically

identifying the property and indicative of possession, the gift is general. In
re Blomdahl's Will, supra note 3.
11 In re Vail's Estate, 67 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1953) ; In re Hinner's Will, 216 Wis.
294, 257 N.W. 148 (1934); In re Elliot's Estate, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 755 (Surr. Ct.

1947).

12 Gilmer v. Gilmer, 42 Ala. 9 (1868).
13 Paulus, supra note 1, at 481. Contra: Mahoney v. Holt, 19 R.I. 660, 36 Atl.

1 (1896) ; Spinney v. Eaton, 111 Me. 1, 87 Atl. 378 (1913).
v. Saunders, 92 F. 2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Spinney v. Eaton, supra

14 Vogel

note 13.

'5 In re Buck's Estate, 32 Cal. 2d 372, 186 P. 2d 708 (1948) ; Paulus, supra note

1, at 490, 491.

16 Adams v. Conqueror Trust Co., 358 Mo. 736, 217 S.W. 2d 476, 7 A.L.R. 2d

268 (1949). Contra: In re Harris' Estate, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (Surr. Ct. 1955),
citing Tifft v. Porter, supra note 4.

17 Paulus, supra note 1, at 498.
18 Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra note 2; Gorham 'v. Chadwick, 135

Me. 479, 200 Atl. 500, 117 A.L.R. 805 (1938); In re Mandelle's Estate, 252
Mich. 375, 233 N.W. 230 (1930) ; Adams v. Conqueror Trust Co., supra note
16; In re Hinner's Will, supra note 11.
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general legatee, but to all accessions and accretions which accrue to
the bequest after testatrix's death. 19 Thus, stock or cash dividends
declared after testatrix's death would pass to the specific legatee even
though earned before testatrix's death. However, even though the
legacy is special, dividends declared on stock during testatrix's lifetime
2 1
do not pass to the legatee,20 even where such dividends are of stock.
The advantage enjoyed by a specific legatee in the increase area
is usurped by the general legatee when ademption by extinction is an
issue. When ademption is involved in a bequest of this type, there is
a division of authority in the decisional law on whether the gift is
general or specific.2 2

The legal significance of determining a gift of

this type to be general is the elimination of any possibility of the
gift being adeemed. Ademption by extinction is the complete failing
of a testamentary gift occurring when the thing given does not exist
as part of testatrix's estate at the time of death in the form in which it
was described in the will.2 3 However, a general bequest, by its very

definition as being one "payable out of general assets of the estate and
which does not require delivery of any specific thing... from any designated portion of testator's property," 24 avoids the entire problem.
This favorable ademption treatment is probably the most compelling
25
reason why many courts favor the general legacy.
The court's determination that a bequest is specific subjects the
legatee to the possibility of losing his entire legacy by ademption by
extinction. Although there is some authority holding that ademption
of a special bequest depends on the testatrix's intention at the time of
the adeeming act, 26 most authorities hold that ademption "depends on
a rule of law arising on the extinction of the thing . . . granted, and
19 In re Largue's Estate, 267 Mo. 104, 183 S.W. 608 (1916) ; In re Mead's Estate,
227 \Vis. 311, 279 N.W. 18, 116 A.L.R. 1127 (1938).
20 Perry v. Leslie, 124 Me. 93, 126 Ati. 340 (1924) ; In re Kernochan, 104 N.Y.
618, 11 N.E. 149 (1887). For discussion of the difference of opinion of the
courts on the distribution of stock dividends declared during testator's lifetime, see Paulus, supra note 1, at 506.
21 ATKINSON, supra note 3, §135, at 750: "It is possible to distinguish between a
stock dividend and a stock split-up on the ground that the former usually
changes the capital structure by transfer of undivided profits into capital,
while the capital structure is unchanged in case of a split-up."
22 Paulus, supra note 1, at 485, citing cases holding such gift to be special:
Vogel v. Saunders, supra note 14; Desoe v. Desoe, 304 Mass. 231, 23 N.E. 2d
82 (1939) ; Ossont's Will, 208 Misc. 449, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
Cases holding such gifts to be general: In re Harris' Estate, supra note 16;
In re McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A. 2d 759 (1950) ; In re Blomdahl's
Will, supra note 3.
23ATKINSON, supra note 3, §134; THOMPSON, THE LAW OF WILLS §519 (3d ed.
1947).
24ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 731.
25 Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra note 2; In re Mandelle's Estate,
supra note 18; Paulus, supra note 1, at 469. See In re Strasenburgh's Estate,
136 Misc. 86, 242 N.Y. Supp. 447, 453, 457 (Surr. Ct. 1928) for a novel presentation of reasons for disfavoring specific gifts.
26 Elwyn v. De Garmendia, 148 Md. 109, 128 Atl. 913 (1925) ; Spinney v. Eaton,
supra note 13.
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operates independently of intention in the event that the specific thing
given is, at testator's death no longer owned by him .... ,,27 The ademption
by extinction may be of the entire gift or pro tanto.2 8
However, if the subject of the gift exists in testatrix's estate at
death but is in a changed form, the legacy may or may not be adeemed.
It is generally held that change in form, if not substantial, does not
cause an ademption. 29 In the event of a stock split where the split
does not change the relationship of the shareholder to the corporation,
or the percent of the )hareholder's ownership therein, there is no
substantial change in form and the legacy is not adeemed. 30 If the capital
structure of the corporation is changed by the split,31 or if the stock
is exchanged upon call for debentures of the corporation, 32 or for stock
in a different company which succeeds the original company, 33 the
change is more substantial and ademption is held to have occurred by
most courts. 34 In the instant case, testatrix's will bequeathed stock

which was the subject of a straight stock split in which only the evidence of the proportionate interest of the shareholders was changed.
Thus, most courts would hold that no ademption by extinction was
caused thereby.
The divergent legal consequences of classification are again evidenced when abatement is in issue. The same lack of unanimity in
decisions is observable in this area as in the increase and ademption
area. 35 By definition abatement is the reduction of legacies because,
at the time for payment thereof, the estate has become insufficient to
pay all debts and expenses and fulfill all bequests made by testatrix. 0
Intestate property is first applied in the payment of debts, taxes and
legacies. Then, in the absence of testamentary indication as to the
order of abatement, legacies abate under the common law rule in the
following order: residuary legacies, general legacies, and specific legacies. 37 Hence, although general legatees are in a desirable position in
C.J.S., Wills §1175, at 991; 30 A.L.R. 678; 40 A.L.R. 556; Ashburner v.
MacGuire, 2 Bro. Ch., 108, 29 Eng., Rep. 62, 2 Eng. Rul. Cas. 18 (Ch. 1786).
28 ATKINSON, sufira note 3, §134; THOMPSON, supra note 23, §516.
2996 C.J.S., Wills §1177; Note, 1910 Wis. L. REv. 307.
30 ATKINSON, supra note 3, §134.
31 In re Brann, 219 N.Y. 263, 114 N.E. 404, 1918B. L.R.A. 663 (1916) ; 4 PAGE,
supra note 3, §1524.
32 First National Bank of Boston v. Perkins Institute for Blind, 275 Mass. 498,
176 N.E. 532 (1931). Contra: Spinney v. Eaton, supra note 13 (intention
theory applied).
33 In re Horn's Estate, 317 Pa. 49, 175 Atl. 414, 97 A.L.R. 1029 (1934); Dean
v. Tusculum, 195 F. 2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
ATKINSON, supra note 3, §134.
35
Vogel v. Saunders, supra note 14 (specific) ; Ladd v. Ladd, 2 Cranch 505, 14
Fed. Cas. 921, No. 7,972 (D.C. Cir. 1824) (general); Lewis v. Sedgwick, 223
Ill. 213, 79 N.E. 14 (1906) (specific); Garron v. Christopher, 112 N.J. Eq.
483, 165 Atl. 77 (Ch. 1933) (general) ; Paulus, supra note 1, at 485.
36 ATKINSON, supra note 3, §136; THOiMiPSON, supra note 23, §510.
37 ATKINSON, supra note 3, §136; THOMPSON, supra note 23, §511; In re Weed's
Will, 213 Wis. 574, 252 N.W. 294 (1934) Under Wis. STATS. §313.26 (1957)
2796
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an ademption situation, they are in a less advantageous position in this
area than are special legatees.
Thus, the court's initial classification of a gift is of crucial importance in the distribution of testatrix's estate. The necessity of
classifying a gift and then abiding by the varying consequences of such
classification as increase, ademption and abatement problems arise, is
often a most difficult and unpleasant task for the court. If the court
designates the bequest as general to avoid being adeemed, the legacy
may be reduced or extinguished by abatement and the legatee usually
would not receive any increase resulting from a stock split. Thus, the
legatee would receive the gift, but that gift would be of greatly diminished proportion to that which testatrix intended. If the bequest is
determined to be specific, the legatee receives the gift in its improved
form and is less likely to have his gift reduced by abatement, but is
confronted with the possibility of having his entire gift eliminated
by ademption.
The inflexibility of the classification approach to distribution problems was perhaps the prime factor in motivating the Illinois Court to
decide this case entirely on what they found to have been testatrix's
intent when she executed her will, as gathered from the document itself
and the circumstances surrounding its execution.
All courts seem to agree that the guiding principle in the interpretation of any will is the intention of the testatrix. However, many
courts appear to utilize this principle only to ascertain whether the
testatrix intended the gift to be general or specific.
The Illinois court was not so restrictive in giving effect to testatrix's intent. After stating the principle that intention should be the
guide to will interpretation, the court commences its analysis of the
testatrix's intention by a consideration of her stated plan for distribution of her estate as it existed at the time of execution of her
will. Thus, the court states that it is obvious from a reading of the
will that she wanted her relatives and friends to have the bulk of her
estate and that she had one favorite charity. From evidence aliunde
it was known that the residuary clause found in the executed will
was an afterthought, suggested by the bank, and added after she
had determined on a substantially complete disposition of her estate.
The court found that because testatrix had at the time of her death
the identical shares of stock she had when she executed her will (except
the additions resulting from the stock splits), she intended to dispose
of all her stock to named legatees. When the will was executed there
was no residue of stock to be given to the residuary legatee. Thus the
through §313.28 (1957)
vailing at common law.

the order of abatement could differ from that pre-
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testatrix must have intended that only the bank balance after expenses
and taxes was to be given to the residuary legatee.
The court then stated:3 "To give the residuary legatee the additional shares of General Electric and General Motors stock would
amount to giving it a legacy of the value of approximately $50,000. .. ,
or 12Y2 times as much as to the charity for which the testatrix had
expressly made provision, four times as much as she gave her sister-inlaw, three times as much as she gave her cousin and in more or less
similar proportions to the provisions made for her other legatees."
Justice Schwartz then reiterated the maxim that "For the purpose
of ascertaining a testator's intention a will speaks from the date of its
execution."3 9 Decedent must have intended that "shares," as the word
was used in her will, meant the proportionate share of total outstanding
stock of the corporations as of the date of her will. Since a stock split
changes only the evidence of the shareholder's proportionate interest
in the company, 40 testatrix must have intended that any additional shares
resulting therefrom would go to the named legatees.
In rejecting the classification approach to this fact situation, the
court states that the purpose of classifying legacies is to determine the
order of distribution of the estate if problems of abatement or ademption are involved. However, because Miss Allen's estate was more
than adequate to cover all bequests and the subject of the legacies
remained as part of her estate until her demise, "the rationale behind
the classification of legacies is not pertinent to our purposes." 4' They
go on to say that "In most cases where a stock split ...

was involved,

42
nothing more than lip service has been paid to the classification."
Instead, they say "courts have sought to find the intention of the
testator, and almost always have found that the additions of stock in

stock splits go to the legatee.

..

,,3

To substantiate these statements the court briefly discusses several
cases on point. Heckler v. Young, 44 the only Illinois case in point,

involved a legacy of 30 shares of a named stock followed by the statement that if the testatrix did not possess such shares at the time of her
death, the legatee was to receive an amount in cash equal to the value
of the stock on the date of execution of the will. At the time the will
was executed the company of the named stock was in the process of
creating a three for one stock split. The court stated that ".

.

. it is

reasonable to suppose that the testatrix had in mind that she had defi38

Allen v. National Bank of Austin, 19 Ill. App. 2d 149, 153 N.E. 2d 260, 262
(1958).

39 Id.
4

0 Id. at 263.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 264 Ill. App. 34 (1931).
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nitely described the shares which she intended complainant to have
and assumed that these shares, after the increase in the whole number
of shares, would pass to complainant in their changed form of 3 to 1." 5
In In Re Fitch's Will,46 the New York court clearly indicated that
intention, rather than classification, was to be the controlling factor.
The testator there disposed of all his stocks which he owned when he
executed his will. Before his death, but after the stocks had been
disposed of, there was a three for one stock split. The court held the
legacies to be general and therefore not adeemed. However, the court
also determined that the legatees were entitled to not only the original
number of shares of stock named in the will, but also the additional
shares resulting from the split. Thus, they held that both general and
specific legatees may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to ad47
ditional stock split shares.
The Illinois Court, in affirming the lower court's decision in this
case, stated: "that in the absence of an intention to the contrary, a
legatee of shares of stock is entitled to additional shares issued as a
result of a stock split occurring after execution of the will.

'4

1

Thus, Illinois, appearing to be one of the jurisdictions which does
not feel bound to classify bequests, seems to put into actual practice
the idea that: "The guiding principle in the interpretation of any will
is the intention of the testator, which is another way of admonishing
the court to keep in mind that the business at hand is determining
49
what the testator willed by his will."
ROBERT EARL KUELTHAU

Bills and Notes: Indorsee of Check After Eight-Day Delay in
Negotiation as Holder in Due Course-Question of Law or FactA check was drawn in payment of the price of a truck sold by payee
to drawer. Drawer, drawee, and payee all maintained their principal
offices within a ten mile radius of each other, and within the same
county. Some four to eight days after issuance, drawer stopped payment, claiming misrepresentation respecting the quality of the truck.
Payee, on the eighth day after issuance, cashed the check at the plaintiff bank, which was not the drawee. Upon prompt presentment to
drawee, payment was refused. Action was brought against drawer,
45 See supra note 38, at 263.
46281 App. Div. 65, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 234, 235 (3rd Dept. 1952).
47In re McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759, 762, 763 (1950).
In
this case, the Pennsylvania court similarly found that although the legacy
was general, the legatee was entitled to increase resulting from a stock split.
The court there stated: ". . . that the intention of the testator governs concerning identity or value of a legacy; that what the testatrix manifestly

48

intended was to bequeath to each legatee 50 shares of the stock as it was at
the time of the making of the will, the equivalent of which was 125 shares
as of the time of death."
See supra note 38, at 265.

49 Id. at 262.

